Israel and Humanity - Specific provisions of Tradition

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§ 2.

SPECIAL PROVISIONS OF THE TRADITION.

On the subject of manslaughter we see that the Rabbis apply the logical principle that governs all Noachism and from which the Noachide is punished for not having learned what to learn is to say in other words he can not claim ignorance in justification of the law.

This principle is essentially different from the Mosaic Law, because according to it, it is necessary for there to be crime, the law has been brought to the attention of guilty by the prosecution witnesses. When it comes to nice, although it recognizes as grounds for acquittal because of ignorance: thus it absolves those who cohabited with a fair bride that he felt free, but by law it condemns those who in such cases to justify declaring he was unaware that adultery was a crime. For the Israelite [1] to the contrary atraha or warning is necessary for it to be made guilty. There is nothing in this difference that flows naturally from the respective economies of the two laws. The Noachism has a character quite rational: it is the Word who enlightens all those who come into this world and that everyone can and should as a rule of life deep in his own conscience. The nature of the Mosaic is different: it is the priestly law enacted not merely for this worlds but for heaven, that is to say, in philosophical language for the reports of the earth with the material universe and spiritual. The practice of true and good, which is the goal of Noachism the extent appropriate to the interests of the individual and the company acquired in Judaism that includes the full scope of the universal order itself. The Mosaic law, therefore, surpasses the current understanding of the man who embraces a more limited sphere of things and its precepts and have a much broader meaning, is the universe that is needed to man form of revelation as it is necessary to form the animal instinct and can say that the revelation is that the instinct of a higher order, which places man in harmony with the order universal and united, through Israel, humanity and the whole earth. Israelite is also alleged he ignored the law, as it has not been formally educated, while this excuse is not allowed in the Noachide whose law eminently rational only is self itself to human consciousness.

Decisions about what rabbinic are very explicit. "The son of Noah is punishable by death for not having learned what he had to learn [2]. He does not need to be subject to trial, or Sanhedrin, or witnesses as the Jews, nor to atraha or warning. The requirement made to him being the purely moral means his conviction for violations.

We will see that this essentially rational, which is unique to Noachism produces a surprising result at first, but who still follows very naturally. The Rabbis is accused of servility so common and narrow-mindedness have been a problem so unusual that serious has perhaps been raised in the criminal law of any [3] country and in any event no legislator, if we suppose that respects the rights of reason and freedom of conscience, has never seriously considered. If ignorance is not accepted as a legitimate excuse for the Noachide, what do you think of anyone who denies the law, which does not recognize its authority or its justice and whose reason refuses to accept his commandments ? Should we regard him as guilty or innocent to keep? We read in the Talmud: "Whoever believes in his heart that homicide is a legitimate thing, it has never been forbidden, as is seen by Raba very similar to the murder ( mézid ) [4] "

Maimonides [5] share this sentiment, but what is done to surprise those who ignore the lofty spirit of the Pharisees so maligned is that two doctors of the Talmud and Rab Hasdai Abay is a review contrary to that of Raba. "Anyone who believes that homicide is a thing permitted, they say in plain terms, yields to a force majeure [6]. This is certainly a modern theory, even very radical, which is not expected to appear at so early a period and in such an environment. Without discussing here the extent to which its application may be compatible with the social order, it is permissible to say the least that such a broadminded necessarily had to bear in other areas, the fruits of freedom and tolerance .

We would not be faithful to the rules of fair criticism, if we passed in silence a provision that seems imbued with a spirit quite different and it is worthwhile to examine its sources. According to Maimonides [7] the Noachide who killed a Jew involuntarily, instead of being relegated to a city of refuge, as is the case for the Jew, would suffer the death penalty. This decision is based on a text otherwise very dark Mantels [8] and in the presence of such excessive rigor and such unequal treatment, commentators have tried to find an acceptable explanation. One of them claims that Maimonides, in another passage, speaking of the son of Noah, who said he incurs no penalty for involuntary transgression of one of the precepts which it is submitted, "except for homicide "[9] is actually not the nice converted to Noachism, but merely a pagan who had accidentally killed another pagan like him. But it is unacceptable that have nice, pure and simple, according to Judaism, a personal status distinct from both the Noachism and the law of Moses and the son of Noah term used by Maimonides is quite inappropriate to designate the kind idolatrous. It seems that the solution to the problem we are provided with the word schogheg itself that the Mosaic law applies to two distinct forms of manslaughter: the first is the murder committed by ignorance, the guilty party has not received the legal notice or atraha , the second is pure and simple accident whose circumstances are sufficient to clearly identify the author of all moral responsibility: a weight that falls accidentally on the head of a passerby, a feature launched against an animal that's going to hurt a man, in short, all the facts that our laws call themselves negligent homicide, while those in the first category are considered as such by the law of Israel.

Apparently this first form of manslaughter, which does, we repeat, this character in the eyes of Jewish law only, that Maimonides has in mind when he declared worthy of death who would know the Noachide guilty vis-à-vis an Israelite. This hypothesis very likely already acquired a greater likelihood for further study of the context. The writer says in effect immediately the reason that justifies his opinion such a provision. "Although schogheg , he said, the Noachide however, is still in a state of legal notice. And he added, to clarify this question: "It is the same gher toschab who kills another in the belief that something is lawful, that is very similar to the murder and the offender is punishable by death, since he had the intent to kill. " This means that for the Noachide the warning is not as essential for the Israelite in his particular religion and that the crime involved in such a distortion of consciousness which he vainly sought a mitigating .

We find in Rashi another formal declaration. On the text of the Talmud: "The proselytes and Gentiles who have killed will suffer death," he commented, "These words relate to the seven precepts imposed on the son of Noah, it is [10] call to the rule that the law ( Azhara ) is enough to condemn the death penalty even manslaughter, as Noachides do not need a warning as we have said the treaty " i> Sanhedrin </i> "[11].

A darkness remains in these traditional provisions of Noachism Homicide. We refer to the rule sanctioned by Maimonides and by which those who had committed manslaughter could be himself slain by the avenger of the victim without the latter in turn and incurred on that the death penalty. But the distinction we made earlier in the meaning of the word schogheg clears this difficulty. Maimonides simply means that when a homicide within the category of acts which the law punishes not the guilty involuntary incurs no less risk of being killed by the parent of the victim, which is that a consequence of the freedom that he leaves. But what is less easily explained, is that he who would kill for revenge is not, according to Maimonides, deemed to have committed a homicide. We must however consider that manslaughter was always the appearance of a crime, since it gives rise to the Israelite punishment of relegation. In addition, the negligence of the tortfeasor commits to a certain extent responsible. We may add that the opinion of Maimonides on this point was considered in contradiction with the Talmud and even with other parts of the same writer.

As for the possibility of the involuntary guilty of being welcomed in a city of refuge, we must distinguish between the killing of a Jew, which exposes the author to avenge his family and that of another in Noachide where recklessness is proven by the Noachism itself, we apply the penalty of banishment, which guarantees the least possible revenge against the parents. In a word schogheg liable to relegation is a negligent homicide in the manner of Noachides, that is to say a man whose share of liability is much greater than in the schogheg of the Mosaic law. It is natural indeed to think that just as the law of Noah differs from that of Moses about the murder, testimony and other items [12] important criminal law, it also deviates from the definition of manslaughter and murder between the simple and absolutely characterized fatal accident that the law does not punish, as there is room in the Mosaic, but in another capacity, for a murder recklessly committing sufficient responsibility of the author that it is condemned to relegation. It seems that if the establishment of cities of refuge may be justly regarded as a means of salvation offered to involuntary murderer, we can easily prove it is also in some cases a legal punishment.


References

  1. Page 687
  2. Maccot , 9 b; Maimonides, Melachim , X 1.
  3. Page 688
  4. Maccot 9 <super> a </super>
  5. Rozeach uschmirat Nefesh , V, 4.
  6. Maccot , 9 <super> a </super>
  7. Passage quoted
  8. Numbers , XXXV, 15.
  9. Page 689
  10. Page 690
  11. Maccot , 9 <super> a </super>
  12. Page 691